> We ascribe moral culpability to the human killer not because of their choice to kill, but because of our own perception that the killer understands what it means to take another life.
Choice is most definitely a factor determining moral culpability. Consider a driver who drives into a pedestrian killing him, because at an unfortunate moment, the driver was paralyzed by an unexpected stroke. The driver witnessed the entire event with full understanding of what it means to take a life. Is he morally culpable? I would say no, because he was not in control. You can also imagine similar scenarios involving coercion or accidents.
The key point is whether we are in control of our actions, or merely witnesses with the illusion of control. I don't see how this can be separated from moral culpability.
Consider a driver who drives into a pedestrian killing him, because at an unfortunate moment, the driver was paralyzed by an unexpected stroke. The driver witnessed the entire event with full understanding of what it means to take a life. Is he morally culpable? I would say no, because he was not in control. You can also imagine similar scenarios involving coercion or accidents.
Right, but in that example, the question of choice doesn't come into play. The paralyzed driver knows what it means to take a life, but they cannot act, regardless of determinism's validity.
The key point is whether we are in control of our actions, or merely witnesses with the illusion of control. I don't see how this can be separated from moral culpability.
In my view, it doesn't matter. From a moral perspective, there is no distinction between the illusion of control and actual control, the variables used to calculate a moral judgement (behavior and the intent driving that behavior) remain unchanged, even if the actor didn't have a choice regarding their intent.
> Right, but in that example, the question of choice doesn't come into play. The paralyzed driver knows what it means to take a life, but they cannot act, regardless of determinism's validity.
Yes, but doesn't determinism mean that all of us 'cannot act'?
> From a moral perspective, there is no distinction between the illusion of control and actual control
Are you saying a fully capable driver would be culpable if he was under the illusion of full control while he drove over a pedestrian? Consider a vehicle malfunction, which goes unnoticed by the driver, leading him to believe he didn't brake or steer fast enough. Is the driver still at fault or is it the car? Doesn't actual control matter?
Yes, but doesn't determinism mean that all of us 'cannot act'?
Let's say, yes. Now what? If all of us 'cannot act' then from a moral perspective there is nothing left to consider. Instead, we ought to shift our concerns to a system that we at least have the illusion of control over (especially since that illusion also encompasses everything we think we really care about in life), which in our reality brings us right back to where we started. If determinism is true, then our morality is part of the deterministic chain, just because we cannot control it doesn't mean that the rules don't have consequences for our reality, in fact, that is the only context in which they have any meaningful consequences at all.
Everyone will continue to behave exactly as if they could act, and we can make predictions about their behavior exactly as if they had the power to make choices, and our system of morals will continue to handle illusory intentions and behaviors just as well as it handles real ones, because at the very moment that a choice bubbles up into our reality, it's already absorbed into the apparent perception that we are making choices. That apparent reality is the only reality as far as we can tell, and certainly the only one where we can actually think about taking actions. Even if its just an illusion, the illusion is the reality we experience.
Are you saying a fully capable driver would be culpable if he was under the illusion of full control while he drove over a pedestrian? Consider a vehicle malfunction, which goes unnoticed by the driver, leading him to believe he didn't brake or steer fast enough. Is the driver still at fault or is it the car? Doesn't actual control matter?
That thought experiment misses the point because the unnoticed malfunction is literally the physical explanation for the accident. We wouldn't consider the driver culpable because he wouldn't have crashed had the malfunction not occurred. On the other hand, a driver that deliberately runs down a person because they enjoy murdering pedestrians is the physical cause of the event, even if they didn't choose to enjoy murdering pedestrians, they in fact do enjoy it, and will continue to do so unmitigated as long as our moral constructs do not react to it. This scenario plays out the same whether the driver truly makes the choice to run over pedestrians or if he just thinks he made the choice. In this case, determinism didn't make the driver a murderer against his will, determinism defined what that will would be, and the physical consequences are put into motion based on that will.
Choice is most definitely a factor determining moral culpability. Consider a driver who drives into a pedestrian killing him, because at an unfortunate moment, the driver was paralyzed by an unexpected stroke. The driver witnessed the entire event with full understanding of what it means to take a life. Is he morally culpable? I would say no, because he was not in control. You can also imagine similar scenarios involving coercion or accidents.
The key point is whether we are in control of our actions, or merely witnesses with the illusion of control. I don't see how this can be separated from moral culpability.