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the bitcoin pseudo-anonymity is a plus, but i feel the real value in this new round of ransomware is that the unlocking actually works. Its possible for the ransomware app to verify payment and unlock itself, with no contact or control from the ransomware author, greatly reducing the author's risk. Actually, its easier for the victim too - rather than wiring funds to some bank account in far off lands, a quick anonymous digital payment instead. Im speculating but its possible for the app to query blockchain.info for a deposit for a given address, or (less likely) for the app to download the blockchain itself, and then unlock after a certain balance. If there is high confidence that the data will actually get unlocked, that swings the balance of fight the app or pay the app towards the pay the app side. The author sits back and waits for those wallets to fill up.


The way this ransomware works still requires a centralized command and control server; without one, it would be possible to trigger the "unlock" codepath in the client without paying the authors.

The authors run a key-storage service which notifies the client (and provides a private key) once payment is received.

In this case the authors are still at a substantial advantage, though - as long as enough unlocks work that "just pay up" is the advice given online, they don't have to care if their C+C server is down half the time or the feds take it down, because the money rolls in even when the decryption isn't working.


That won't work, it could be prevented by a man-in-the-middle attack on the victim's own computer. Just spoof the blockchain signatures required as if the payment was sent on an ad-hoc network and the program would unlock itself.


If blockchain.info was queried over ssl, the spoofing would be a bit harder to pull off.




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