You can't do #2 without doing #1 - most in-demand land is already occupied and unused land is typically not worth developing (or doing so would cause environmental harm).
In an all-owner-occupant suburb, this isn't so much of a problem: you're literally paying people lots of money to accept the disruption of having to move. However, in almost every other kind of housing arrangement, ownership over the building is separate from occupancy, and it's not the occupant's choice to make regarding increasing the housing supply. This is the left-NIMBY trap: any action to increase housing units necessarily displaces the most marginalized parts of society. If your pro-development policy doesn't include a plan to house people who are being displaced without increasing their expenses, then you're likely to make people start protesting the new buildings that need to be built in order to accommodate demand and actually cap rent growth.
Other than that, yes. Make housing printer go brrr.
This is one of the most reasoned explanations of the key problem where development meets rent control that I've ever read. If you turned it into a longer piece that explored the monetary and non-monetary incentives on all sides I would send it to everyone thinking about this issue. If I can help please let me know.
Of course you can. The law can be that normally rent control applies, but if you are building a new building, that doubles the amount of housing supply on the land, you can kick out the existing residents if you pay them a large payout.
This would allow new housing to built in the obvious places where it should be, and the obvious cases where a huge amount of new housing is planned to be built.
I'd actually totally love to see this proposed in more left-leaning city councils. This is sort of the idea I've had in my head for how to short-circuit the left-NIMBY trap, but I have no idea how good or bad it would actually be at moving the needle in favor of growth.
Part of the problem I could see right off the bat would be the fact that owners and occupants are inherently antagonized to one another; as in, the more money you require to be given as a displacement subsidy; the less is available to actually incentivize land development. Of course, in places like SF the market rate for housing is so hilariously high that there might actually be enough money for both parties, at least for a little while.
Another idea might be to require that the developer first offer to rent a unit in the new building to all the old tenants, at their old rent, if they want to move back after construction is complete. A side-effect is that this doesn't encourage the developer to build something nicer than what was already there. But in some cases that might actually be a good thing.
But yeah, these sorts of things generally reduce the amount of money available to do the new development in the first place. But maybe that's ok too?
In an all-owner-occupant suburb, this isn't so much of a problem: you're literally paying people lots of money to accept the disruption of having to move. However, in almost every other kind of housing arrangement, ownership over the building is separate from occupancy, and it's not the occupant's choice to make regarding increasing the housing supply. This is the left-NIMBY trap: any action to increase housing units necessarily displaces the most marginalized parts of society. If your pro-development policy doesn't include a plan to house people who are being displaced without increasing their expenses, then you're likely to make people start protesting the new buildings that need to be built in order to accommodate demand and actually cap rent growth.
Other than that, yes. Make housing printer go brrr.