>However, multiple people actually have provided that evidence and explained in great detail why your idea and formula is wrong.
This is false. The only comment that actually purported to respond said there's an issue with an error rate in applying the fine. This is a minor problem, nowhere close to justifying a massive differential across all income levels.
>So if you want to figure out why you are wrong, which you are, feel free to examine the legal systems of those countries.
Of course, the fact that a country does something does not imply it's economically sound, and your implication of such is absurd. You've yet to give any economic rationale for "punishment" as opposed to deterrence, yet continue to cite "punishment" as a justification.
I'm happy to concede that this does, in fact, "punish people with different incomes equally hard", but since punishment is a stupid goal, this is useless.
>You haven't provided any evidence for you "model"
I provided all assumptions required to derive it; you need to disprove some explicit or implicit assumption, or agree.
...and the reasons I give very much apply to "deterrence": if committing this crime/misdemeanour will cost me 6 minutes of my life, iff I get caught, I am not deterred. At all. If it costs me a month, I probably am.
>The purpose of a speeding ticket is to (a) punish and (b) deter.
You've yet to give any justification of "punishment" in this context outside of deterrence, and you've explicitly claimed that punishment is distinct from the deterrence effect. Linking to various definitions of punishment is just silly.
>A country is not an economy. An economy serves society, not the other way around.
>...and the reasons I give very much apply to "deterrence": if committing this crime/misdemeanour will cost me 6 minutes of my life, iff I get caught, I am not deterred. At all. If it costs me a month, I probably am.
If the goal is maximizing deterrence, then as above, just set a million dollar fine for everyone. You claimed that would be "disproportionate" above but gave no reason why that's more important than establishing a deterrence effect.
Again, a constant fine establishes a constant deterrence effect. This will not mean that the same percentage of people of any group will end up commiting the crime, both because their initial probability of doing it may differ and because their desires to do it may differ.
You've yet to respond to my point that demonstrates that fines will either be set too high or too high under such a system.
Here's a paper with 300 citations that lays out largely the same model I did and which you dismissed as not supported by evidence: https://www.jstor.org/stable/725557?seq=1
They actually add the enforcement cost of administering the fine, which makes sense but doesn't significantly change the conclusion.
This is false. The only comment that actually purported to respond said there's an issue with an error rate in applying the fine. This is a minor problem, nowhere close to justifying a massive differential across all income levels.
>So if you want to figure out why you are wrong, which you are, feel free to examine the legal systems of those countries.
Of course, the fact that a country does something does not imply it's economically sound, and your implication of such is absurd. You've yet to give any economic rationale for "punishment" as opposed to deterrence, yet continue to cite "punishment" as a justification.
I'm happy to concede that this does, in fact, "punish people with different incomes equally hard", but since punishment is a stupid goal, this is useless.
>You haven't provided any evidence for you "model"
I provided all assumptions required to derive it; you need to disprove some explicit or implicit assumption, or agree.