> Humans don't operate on truth, they operate on psychological & social-cultural motivation, and use "truth" as a pretext.
But I suppose you consider your critique of truth to be true? Forgive the seeming snark. It's not meant unkindly. This kind of thing is not easy to talk about, as philosophy's historical mess shows.
OK so its the case (or 'true'!) that most arguments are post hoc rationalisations for positions actually determined by a complex chain of psychological and social-historical causes. I agree. This is not an insight unique to European philosophy. Many disciplines and lines of argument get to that position.
The issue becomes how to mitigate such bias effects. My contentions are that (1) the empirical-scientific strand of the Enlightenment does a far better and more historically significant job of this than the philosophical, so your (or Adorno et als) target is already a relatively inconsequential one, and that (2) science does this by contraining its ontology within an etiolated language that mis- or under- represents the real world.
What's 'wrong' with the most important heir of the Enlightenment (science), if conceived as an inclusive framework from which to view the world, isn't that it's as myth-infused as pre-Enlightenment thought, but rather that the world it attempts to describe isn't where we actually live.
But I suppose you consider your critique of truth to be true? Forgive the seeming snark. It's not meant unkindly. This kind of thing is not easy to talk about, as philosophy's historical mess shows.
OK so its the case (or 'true'!) that most arguments are post hoc rationalisations for positions actually determined by a complex chain of psychological and social-historical causes. I agree. This is not an insight unique to European philosophy. Many disciplines and lines of argument get to that position.
The issue becomes how to mitigate such bias effects. My contentions are that (1) the empirical-scientific strand of the Enlightenment does a far better and more historically significant job of this than the philosophical, so your (or Adorno et als) target is already a relatively inconsequential one, and that (2) science does this by contraining its ontology within an etiolated language that mis- or under- represents the real world.
What's 'wrong' with the most important heir of the Enlightenment (science), if conceived as an inclusive framework from which to view the world, isn't that it's as myth-infused as pre-Enlightenment thought, but rather that the world it attempts to describe isn't where we actually live.